The Structural Flaws of Indonesia’s 1998 Reform Movement

 

Photo: Illustration. By: Laksamana Sukardi
(Minister of State-Owned Enterprises 1999–2004; Co-founder of PDI Perjuangan; Former Banker and Member of Parliament)

CNEWS, Jakarta, September 29, 2025 – The 1998 Reform Movement was a historic turning point in Indonesia’s political journey. It toppled the authoritarian New Order regime that had ruled for more than three decades. Its original aspirations were noble: to restore citizens’ political rights, dismantle authoritarian control, and build democratic institutions.

The results were evident in the birth of new political parties, amendments to the 1945 Constitution, and the establishment of key institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).

Yet, 25 years later, the legacy of Reformasi has exposed serious structural flaws. Instead of strengthening democracy, Reformasi gave rise to a new form of authoritarianism within political parties. The core mistake was granting parties near-absolute power without embedding accountability mechanisms.

From the Euphoria of Freedom to Party Monopoly

The political psychology of 1998 was filled with euphoria after long-suppressed political rights were reclaimed. During the New Order era, only three parties were recognized: Golkar, PDI, and PPP. Reformasi opened up political space, legalizing the formation of many new parties.

However, this newfound freedom also handed the gates of democracy entirely to political parties. They became the sole institutions authorized to nominate candidates for legislative and executive offices—from president to local parliament members. Citizens were left only to choose among candidates already filtered by party elites.

Over time, power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of party chairpersons. These figures gained enormous influence over policy direction, both in parliament and the executive branch.

The Absolute Power of Party Leaders

Constitutional amendments following Reformasi strengthened parliament (DPR), which, in turn, amplified the control of party elites. The DPR holds strategic authority to select key state officials: Supreme Court justices, the Governor of Bank Indonesia, OJK commissioners, BPK auditors, even the TNI Commander and the National Police Chief.

Since parliamentary factions are fully subordinate to party chairmen, such authority has become concentrated in the hands of a few elites. They not only decide who occupies public office but also control legislation, budgets, and oversight. A closed circle of power has emerged—without clear mechanisms of checks and balances.

Democratic Pillars Without Democracy

This produced a paradox: democratic pillars were built on undemocratic foundations. Party leaderships evolved into power franchises dominated by transactional logic, popularly summed up by the phrase wani piro? (“how much?”).

Internal party democracy is almost nonexistent. Party chairs rarely change through fair processes and are often passed down within families, entrenching political dynasties. As a result, parties—supposed to be the people’s voice—now sever the link between citizens and their representatives.

Two decades ago, I warned in my book Political Party Reform: More Important than Elections that if this trend persisted, public aspirations would be blocked. That warning has now materialized.

Public satire captures the irony: “Light above, darkness below,” and “Businessmen become rulers, rulers become businessmen.” Both reflect the fusion of political and economic interests, further eroding public trust.

Consequences of Structural Errors

The core mistake of Reformasi was its failure to anticipate the trajectory of power. By granting unchecked authority to party elites without accountability safeguards, the political system became vulnerable to abuse.

Public aspirations are no longer channeled through formal institutions. The educated class opts to leave the country (brain drain), while the majority vent frustrations through street protests. Without genuine opposition and internal accountability, democracy stagnates under oligarchic dominance. Politics now serves elite interests rather than the people’s.

The Path to Corrective Reform

Indonesia’s challenge today is not starting over but repairing the flawed design of Reformasi. Urgent corrective steps include:

1. Political Party Reform – enforce internal democracy and accountability.
2. Political Governance Reform – redesign nomination processes, competency requirements, and bureaucratic efficiency.
3. Economic Rent Review – reassess distribution of natural resource concessions.
4. State Wealth Transparency – require public officials to disclose assets openly.
5. Separation of Politics and Business – prevent the fusion of economic and political elites.
6. Independent Law Enforcement – strengthen professionalism of the judiciary and the KPK.
7. Equitable Social Security – ensure fair protection for all citizens.

Corrective reform requires both political courage and intellectual leadership. The poor lack instruments to propose systemic solutions—hence, academics and public intellectuals must provide direction and a roadmap.

Reformasi 1998 succeeded in dismantling authoritarianism but failed to prevent the rise of party oligarchy. By granting unchecked power to party elites, it left behind structural imbalances now threatening Indonesia’s democratic future.

Indonesia does not need a “total reset” but systemic renewal: restoring the people’s voice, limiting elite abuse, and returning democracy to the hands of citizens—not dynasties.

Only through such measures can the promises of Reformasi be fulfilled. And only with divine guidance and collective national resolve can Indonesia avoid slipping into democratic decline.

(RED.CN)